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An Upwind Battle: The EPA Tests the Limits of Its
Statutory Authority Again
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Transport Rule was promulgated by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in August of 2011 in
order to address the emissions reduction responsibilities of
upwind states with reference to their contribution of downwind
states' nonattainment of national air quality standards. However,
when this rule was challenged, the D.C. Circuit found that the
Transport Rule exceeded the EPA's statutorily designated
authority.
2
The Court held that the parameters of the rule forced
some upwind states to bear more than their responsibility of
reducing emissions of a downwind state. 3  Additionally, the
Transport Rule allowed the EPA to issue Federal Implementation
Plans before giving individual states the opportunity to create and
adopt State Implementation Plans, which would describe how the
state planned to meet the required national air quality standards
set by the EPA.4 The court found both of these issues to be
crucial errors, and thus vacated the Transport Rule in a 2-1
holding.5  The result of this vacatur was that the Clean Air
Interstate Rule remained intact and operative, although also
flawed, since the Transport Rule was the EPA's solution to make
1 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).




5 Id. at 12.
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the Clean Air Interstate Rule compliant with court precedent and
consistent with the EPA's congressionally delegated authority.
6
This case stands as one in a series of cases that serve to
illustrate an emerging trend, repetitively holding that the EPA has
exceeded its authority with regard to a given rule. The courts
have consistently held that the EPA must act within the
boundaries of the statutes, showing a certain judicial preference
for plain meaning statutory construction and cooperative
federalism. This approach serves to define a clear limit on the
boundaries of the EPA's authority.
With such clear judicial guidance on what the EPA can
and cannot do, it is difficult to ascertain why the trend has
continued. While underlying political motivations may often
serve as a possible answer to nearly every question, the answer to
this one may be more simple: administrative convenience and
expediency. The EPA is a huge agency, with numerous areas of
the environment that it regulates. In many cases, it is more
simple, and arguably more cost effective, to quickly create a rule,
without waiting to conduct scientific research or study court
opinions to delineate the limits of an agency's authority. And
although such a results-oriented approach may work in other
legal and non-legal spheres, it is abundantly clear that the EPA's
approach in these cases simply does not work.
Instead of achieving results to improve the environment
and public health, the EPA has been forced to allocate its time
and resources to defending its choices in court and seeing those
rules vacated, with no progress being made. The EPA has seen
long periods of success in improving the environment through the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") and the Clean Water Act, and it seems as
though following the statutory rules would allow the EPA to
expend time and resources on actually protecting the environment
6 Id. at 37.
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and furthering the public health of America, instead of arguing
about it in court.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In August 2011, the EPA promulgated the Transport
Rule,7 which defines the emissions reduction responsibilities for
certain upwind states with reference to their role in the air quality
issues of downwind states. 8 In response to the promulgation of
this rule, various states, local governments, industry groups, and
labor organizations sought judicial review of the rule, arguing
that the rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority under theCAA.'
The Transport Rule seeks to solve a complicated
regulatory issue for the EPA: some emissions of air pollutants
affect air quality in the area where those pollutants are emitted,
while other air pollutants travel and influence the air quality
elsewhere, such as a downwind state. 10 In order to regulate and
control air pollution, Congress established a "federalism-based
system" under the CAA, where the federal government sets
specific air quality standards, while the individual states then bear
the central obligation of creating a strategy to meet those federal
standards within that state." Additionally, upwind states are
required to prevent sources within their state from "emitting
federally determined 'amounts' of pollution that travel across
state lines and 'contribute significantly' to a downwind state's
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'nonattainment' of federal air quality standards."' 2  This is
referred to as the "good neighbor" provision of the rule.
13
Based upon the legal principle that, "absent a claim of
constitutional authority (and there is none here), executive
agencies may exercise only the authority conferred by statute,
and agencies may not transgress statutory limits on that
authority,"' 14 the Court held that the Transport Rule exceeded the
EPA's statutory authority as a federal agency for two separate
reasons. 15 First, under the Transport Rule, upwind states could
be compelled to reduce emissions of air pollutants "by more than
their own significant contributions to a downwind state's
nonattainment."' 6  The statutory text at issue only granted
authority to the EPA to mandate that upwind states reduce "only
their own significant contributions to a downwind state's
nonattainment." 17  Additionally, through the CAA, Congress
granted the option to the states to implement the federal reduction
requirements on their own terms. 18 If states did not issue a state
implementation plan ("SEP") in response to those federal
standards, then the EPA would develop a federal implementation
plan ("FIP") to implement federal standards for the state. 19
However, the Transport Rule did not allow states the option of
first creating their own SIP; instead, the EPA "quantified states'
good neighbor obligations and simultaneously set forth EPA-
designed [FIPs].,, 20 The Court held that, for those two reasons,
the Transport Rule violated federal statute, and, based on that





16 Id. (emphasis added).
17 Id. (emphasis added).
1"Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1)(A) (2012).
20 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 11-12.
21 Id. at 12.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The CAA, as amended by Congress in 1990, designates
the responsibilities of the EPA in protecting air quality by
creating national air quality standards. 22  Under the CAA, the
federal government sets the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ("NAAQS") 23, but the states are delegated the primary
duty of determining how to reach and maintain those standards
within that state.24 Therefore, under this framework, individual
states may establish "the particular restrictions that will be
imposed on particular emitters within their borders. 25 If a state
chooses not to comply or regulate on their own, then the federal
government, under the EPA, may intercede to regulate the
NAAQS for that state through a FIP.26 Ultimately, the EPA
designates 'nonattainment' areas, which are "areas within each
state where the level of the pollutant exceeds the NAAQS. ' 27
After the EPA assigns a nonattainment area within a given state,
the burden then shifts to that state to apply the NAAQS. Under a
SIP, a state will identify the sources of pollutants that must
decrease emissions and will designate the amount by which those
emissions must be reduced.28
22 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONAGENCY, AIR POLLUTION AND THE CLEAN
AIR ACT, EPA.GOv, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/ (last updated Aug. 15, 2013).
23 The NAAQS fix the "maximum permissible levels of common pollutants in
the ambient air." EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 12 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 7409(a)-(b)). The EPA must prescribe NAAQS levels that will guard
the protective health. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 13 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
24 Id. at 12 (citing Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 63-67 (1975)).
25 Id.
26 id.
271d. at 13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (2012)).
28 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 13. The Court elaborates that, for
example, a state may have impose varying limits on emissions on "coal-
burning power plants, natural gas-burning power plants, and other sources of
pollution", which could include "factories, refineries, incinerators, and
agricultural activities." Id.
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Under § 110 of the CAA, each state is required to create a
SIP within three years of the enactment or revision of a
NAAQS.29  Relevant to this case is the "good neighbor"
provision, which states that a SIP must incorporate sufficient
provisions that will prohibit "any source or other type of
emissions activity within the state from emitting any air pollutant
in amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other state" in reference
to any NAAQS.30 Essentially, this provision requires that an
upwind state "bear responsibility for their fair share of the mess
in downwind states." 3 1 The good neighbor provision, as written,
uses an upwind state's SIP as a mechanism to establish its "good
neighbor obligation" to the affected downwind state(s).32
However, an upwind state's good neighbor obligations are
unknown until the pollution levels of the downwind states are
ascertained, and it is the role of the EPA to calculate these
levels. 33  Once the EPA determines pollution levels in
nonattainment downwind states, the upwind state can then
implement a plan to meet the good neighbor obligations by
revising or creating a new SIP.34 If an upwind state does not
revise or create a new SIP, incorporating the effects of the good
neighbor provision, then the federal government may intervene
with a FIP in order to meet the NAAQS. 35
Prior cases have also addressed the good neighbor
provision of the CAA, as well as the EPA's application efforts.
Michigan v. EPA3 6 addressed the EPA's NO, Rule, which
"quantified the good neighbor obligations of 22 states with
29 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
30 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D).





36213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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respect to the 1997 ozone NAAQS." 37 The NO, Rule failed to
identify "amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to
nonattainment" based upon the impact on air quality in
downwind states; instead, the EPA looked at the amount of NO,
that could be reduced based upon the installation of more cost-
effective "emissions controls." 38  In the instant case, it was
argued that the statute mandated that the EPA demand emissions
reductions "based on air quality impact alone, not cost of
reduction." 39 The court disagreed with that argument, holding
that there was "no clear congressional intent to preclude
consideration of cost." 40 Under this rationale, the EPA may use
cost of reduction to reduce the good neighbor obligations of an
upwind state.
41
In a second case, North Carolina v. EPA,42 the court
considered issues arising from the EPA's 2005 Clean Air
Interstate Rule ("CAIR"), which piggy-backed the 1998 NOx
Rule by characterizing the good neighbor obligations of 28 states
"with respect to the 1997 ozone NAAQS and the 1997 NAAQS
for annual levels of fine particulate matter, or annual PM 2.5.
43
CAIR used two separate formulas to calculate an individual
state's good neighbor obligations for SO 2 and NOx.44 The North
Carolina majority stated that use of these two formulas exceeded
the EPA's statutory authority because the formulas surpassed the
allowances made by the Michigan court to let the EPA use cost
reduction as a consideration in determining good neighbor
37 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 14. The NOx Rule is "commonly
referred to as the NOx SIP Call." Id.38 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Michigan, 213
F.3d at 675.).39 id.
40 Id. (internal citations omitted).41 id.
42 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).43 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 14 (citing North Carolina v. EPA,
531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
44Id.
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obligations.45  The court elaborated that the EPA had the
authority to use cost considerations to "require termination of
only a subset of each state's contribution ... but [the] EPA can't
just pick a cost for a region, and deem 'significant' any emissions
that sources can eliminate more cheaply." 46 Furthermore, the
statute did not allow the EPA to require an upwind state to "share
the burden of reducing other upwind states' emissions. 47
Instead, each state must remove its own contribution of pollutants
from downwind states.48
Therefore, the effect of North Carolina on Michigan was
that the CAA allowed the EPA to consider cost to reduce an
upwind state's good neighbor obligations, but the EPA did not
have statutory authority to utilize cost to augment an upwind
state's good neighbor obligations. 49 Under this precedent, the
good neighbor provision only compels each upwind state "to
clean up at most its own share of the air pollution in a down wind
state-not other states' shares., 50 However, the North Carolina
court remanded CAIR without vacating it for revision.51
Therefore, CAIR remained in place until the EPA replaced it with
a new statute that complies with the North Carolina holding.52
The Transport Rule-the statute at issue in the instant
case-is the EPA's effort to promulgate a rule consistent with
North Carolina. The Transport Rule has two parts: first, it defines
the emissions reduction obligations of each state, as mandated by
the good neighbor provision, and, second, it lays out FliPs that
will apply those obligations "at the state level.,
53
45 Id.46 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 id.
491Id. at 14-15.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the first section of the 2-154 majority opinion, the court
held, under the good neighbor provision, the EPA exceeded its
statutory authority in issuing the Transport Rule; the statute limits
the EPA to requiring upwind states to reduce " 'amounts which
will... contribute significantly to nonattainment' in downwind
states. 55
The court began its opinion by reiterating that the
Transport Rule characterizes the duties of a state under the "good
neighbor" provision of the CAA, which defines the necessary
parameters of a SIP. 56  The court reasoned that, although the
statute delegates significant discretion to the EPA, statutory text
and judicial precedents focus and limit that authority.57  The
statutory text states that the "amounts which will... contribute"
to nonattainment in a downwind state are "at most those amounts
that travel beyond an upwind state's borders and end up in a
downwind state's nonattainment area." 58 Therefore, the statute
does not allow the EPA to regulate air pollution on a regional
54 Judge Rogers wrote a lengthy dissent, which formed a framework for the
arguments that the EPA advanced in their petition for rehearing en banc: "to
vacate the Transport Rule, the court disregards limits Congress placed on its
jurisdiction, the plain text of the [CAA], and this court's settled precedent
interpreting the same statutory provisions at issue today.. .The result is an
unsettling of the consistent precedent of this court strictly enforcing
jurisdictional limits, a redesign of Congress's vision of cooperative federalism
between the states and the federal government in implementing the CAA
based on the court's own notions of absurdity and logic that are unsupported
by a factual record, and a trampling on this court's precedent on which the
[EPA] was entitled to rely in developing the Transport Rule rather than be
blindsided by arguments raised for the first time in this court." See id at 38-61
(Rogers, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012)).56 Id. The "good neighbor" provision is Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Clean
Air Act.57 EME Homer City Generations, 696 F.3d at 19.58 Id. at 20 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)).
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level without focusing on the pollutant contributions of individual
states. 59 Furthermore, under the precedent of North Carolina, the
EPA cannot mandate that any upwind state "share the burden of
reducing other upwind states' emissions."60 The statutory text
and precedent serve as a restraint on the EPA's authority: but for
contributions of upwind states, if a downwind state could meet
the NAAQS, then the upwind states' combined share of
contributions is the full amount by which the NAAQS have been
exceeded; when the EPA apportions that combined contribution
burden among the upwind states, the EPA cannot compel any
individual upwind state to share that burden of the emissions of
another upwind state. 61 Instead, each upwind state may take on
only its own share of the excess emissions. 62 Under this analysis,
according to the court, the" 'significance' of each upwind state's
contribution cannot be measured in a vacuum, divorced from the
impact of the other upwind states."
63
In applying these principles to the EPA's Transport Rule,
the court noted that the authority of the EPA, as an administrative
industry, is limited to that granted by Congress. 64  In
promulgating the Transport Rule, the EPA used a "two-stage
approach to define 'amounts which will . . . contribute
significantly' to downwind attainment problems." 65  The first
stage identified the upwind states that were deemed to be
significant contributors to the nonattainment of certain downwind
59 EME Homer City Generations, 696 F.3d at 20.
60 Id. (citing North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under
North Carolina, the part of an upwind state's contribution that "contributes
significantly" to a downward state's nonattainment is dependent on the
"relative contributions of that upwind state, of other upwind state contributors,
and of the downwind state itself." Id.61 1d. at 20-21.
62 id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 22 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988)).65 Id. at23.
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states.66 Any upwind state that surpassed the "significant
threshold ' 67 was included in the second stage of the EPA's
analysis. 68 In the second stage, the EPA undertook a cost-based
analysis of emissions reductions, requiring power plants in each
state to "cut all of the emissions they could eliminate at a given
cost per ton of pollution reduced-regardless of the 'amounts' of
the state's emissions [the] EPA deemed to 'contribute
significantly' at stage one and regardless of the relative
contributions of the other upwind states and the downwind
state."
69
The court notes three problems with this approach by the
EPA. First, the Transport Rule is defective because it does not
comply with North Carolina, since the EPA mandate placed on
upwind states is not based on the amounts that the individual
states contribute significantly to nonattainment of downwind
states. 70 As the court explains, the
EPA determined that a state was subject to
the good neighbor provision if it contributed at
least a certain threshold amount to air pollution in
a downwind state. But [the] EPA then imposed
restrictions based on region-wide air quality
modeling projections; those restrictions could
require upwind states to reduce emissions by more
than the amount of that contribution.7'
66 id.
67 Id. The EPA concluded that an upwind state's contribution to nonattainment
of a downwind state was significant if it exceeded the following "air quality
thresholds:" 0.8 ppb for ozone, 0.15 g/m3 for annual PM 2.5, and 0.35 g/m 3 for
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The court determined that this approach did not comport
with the statutory and precedential requirements that the EPA
cannot force a state to account for more than their share of the
downwind state's emissions.
72
The court added that the Transport Rule is flawed under a
second related rationale: it "runs afoul of the statute's
proportionality requirement., 73 Under North Carolina, the EPA
does not have authority to require an upwind state to share the
burden of reducing the pollutant emissions of another upwind
state.74 It is not allowed for one upwind state to eliminate "more
than its statutory fair share" because that state is essentially being
required to "clean up another upwind state's share of the mess in
the downwind state. 75  Because the Transport Rule did not
"calculate upwind states' required reductions on a proportional
basis that took into account contributions of other upwind states
to the downwind states' nonattainment problems," which violates
the statute-the EPA must take into account the downwind
state's own contribution, and include it with the contributions of
the upwind states.
76
In the second half of its opinion, the court discusses
another separate problem with the Transport Rule: it fails to give
states the initial opportunity to implement the federal standards
through SIPs; instead, the Transport Rule simultaneously created
FIPs to implement the good neighbor obligations for the states.
77
The CAA allows states to first implement the air quality
standards through a SIP. 78 "By preemptively issuing FIPs," the
EPA deprived the states of that option, while also "punishing the
states for failing to meet a standard that the EPA had not yet
"21d. at 26.
73 id.
74 Id. (citing North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008).751d. at 27.
76 id.
77 1d. at 28.78 id.
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announced and the state[s] did not yet know" since the EPA's
"findings came before the Transport Rule quantified the states'
good neighbor obligations." 7
9
The Court elaborated that the CAA delegates the
responsibilities of preserving air quality between the federal and
state governments, creating a certain division of labor between
these authorities. 80  Under this careful balance, the federal
government is tasked with creating air quality standards, while
the states are given the first opportunity for determining how to
meet those standards. 81  However, this division has been
described by courts as "erecting a statutory 'federalism bar'
under § 110 of the [CAA],... [which] prohibits [the] EPA from
using the SIP process to force states to adopt specific control
measures;" this 'federalism bar' thus puts the EPA in a secondary
role in terms of enforcing the air quality standards. 82
The relevant inquiry in the instant case therefore becomes
whether the EPA can use this authority to quantify a state's good
neighbor obligations while simultaneously issuing a FIP, thereby
bypassing the state's opportunity to first develop a SIP .83 The
Court noted that the CAA establishes a "federal backstop" if a
state fails to create a SIP: if the EPA finds that a state fails to
submit a SIP or if the EPA rejects the SIP, then the EPA is
allowed two years to issue a FIP if the state fails to correct the
deficient SIP. 84 Under this statutory structure, the Court stated
that a state's implementation of its good neighbor obligations
cannot "be considered part of the state's 'required submission' in
79 id.
'
0 Id. at 29.81 Id. (citing Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997),).
82 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 29 (citing Virginia, 108 F.3d
1397; Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 63, 67 (1975); American Trucking Ass'ns.
v. EPA, 600 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).83 EEff Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 30.
84 id.
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its SIP (or whether the SIP can be deficient for failing to
implement the good neighbor obligation) even before the EPA
quantifies the state's good neighbor obligation." 85 Instead, the
EPA may only mandate that states revise or create a new SIP
after the EPA has established the emissions obligations for the
states, and the EPA cannot find that a SIP is deficient until after
the EPA has defined the good neighbor obligations. 86 Similarly,
the EPA must allow the states a "reasonable amount of time to
implement that requirement with respect to sources within the
state."87
In this case, the EPA rejected SIPs on a finding of
deficiency or failure to submit because the EPA made its findings
before it informed the states "what emissions reductions their
SIPs were supposed to achieve under the good neighbor
88 89provision." Unlike other NAAQS, the good neighbor
obligation is not a "clear numerical target;" instead, the states
cannot know their good neighbor obligation until the EPA
defines it.90  The court disagreed with the EPA's FIP-first
approach, stating the "EPA pursues its reading of the statutory
text down the rabbit hole to a wonderland where [the] EPA
defines the target after the States' chance to comply with the
target has already passed." 9' Instead, the court held that a statute
"cannot be construed in a vacuum, . . . [and] the FIP-first
approach is incompatible with the basic text and structure of the
[CAA].' As a result, the court held that the "deficiency [of the
Transport Rule] is too fundamental to permit us to 'pick and
choose portions' of the rule to preserve" and that the
85 Id.
86 Id. at 31.
87 id.
88 Id. at 31-32.
89 By comparison, the NAAQS for PM2.5 is 15 Vg/m 3 . Id. at 32.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 33 (emphasis added) (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S.Ct.
2307, 2317).921d. (citing Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1350, 1357 (2012)
(quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989))).
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"fundamental flaws foreclose [the] EPA from promulgating the
same standards on remand." 93 The court therefore vacated the
Transport Rule, leaving the EPA to continue administering CAIR
while working to develop a legally proper replacement for
CAIR. 94
V. COMMENT
In the instant case, the majority panel explicitly stated that
the EPA had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the
Transport Rule; however, this case is neither the first nor most
recent case where a court has made this finding. Instead, this
language referencing the EPA stepping outside of its
congressionally authorized boundaries has become somewhat of
a moniker, as well as a pattern that has begun to emerge in recent
years. The reasons for this trend likely vary, ranging from
political battles between liberal and conservatives, to a general
sluggishness or sloppiness in rulemaking on the part of the EPA.
The implications of this pattern are also wide-ranging, but court
opinions have set clear boundaries on EPA authority, with an
underlying theme that touts "cooperative federalism" in place of
strict agency deference to the EPA and its whims.
A. Parallel Cases: Other Courts Find That the
EPA Exceeded Its Authority
In Sierra Club v. EPA, the most recent case to follow this
trend, the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA lacked the authority to
promulgate a rule that would exempt various sources from
requirements of the CAA.95 The controversy surrounded a final
rule issued by the EPA under § 166 of the CAA that created
93 Id. at 37 (citing North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 929 (D.C. Cir.
2008)).94 Id. at 38.
9' 705 F.3d 458 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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regulations for the pollutant PM2 .5. 96 The rule set Significant
Impact Levels ("SILs") and a Significant Monitoring
Concentration ("SMC") for PM 25. 97  SILs and SMCs are
mechanisms that the EPA can use to screen whether certain
sources can be exempted from various requirements of the
CAA.98 The Sierra Club petitioned the court, arguing the EPA
lacked the authority to promulgate such a rule. 99 Interestingly,
and uncommonly, the EPA conceded that the SILs failed to show
the EPA's "intent in promulgating"'' 00 them and thus requested
vacatur in order to make the necessary revisions; however, the
EPA still maintained that the portion of the rule that established
the SMC was a valid use of authority.'
0
'
While the court granted the EPA's request to vacate and
remand the portion of the rule concerning SILs, the court
disagreed that the SMC for PM 2.5 was appropriate. 10 2 The court
agreed with the Sierra Club that the EPA lacked the "de minimis
authority to promulgate the SMC" for PM2.5, which could be
employed to "exempt an owner of a proposed source or
modification from undertaking the year-long pre-construction air
quality monitoring requirement under § 165(e)(2)" of the
CAA. 10 3 The court noted that Congress was " 'extraordinarily
rigid' in mandating pre-construction air quality monitoring," and
that the EPA thus exceeded its authority in attempting to
promulgate rules that would circumvent this requirement. 1°4 In
an appropriate showing of deference to congressional intent, the
court added that "Congress provided a clear mandate that the
EPA does not have the authority to disregard, even if the
96 Id. at 459.
97 d. at 459-60. PM2.5 is particulate matter that is smaller than 2.5
micrometers. Id. at 459.98 Id. at 459-60.
99 Id. at 460.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 464.
112 Id. at 469.
103 Id. at 466.1 4id.
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mandated requirements appear to be superfluous;" if Congress
had wanted to grant discretion to the EPA to bypass those
requirements, they would have explicitly stated that intent. 
105
In Mingo Logan Coal Company, Inc. v. EPA,10 6 the court
found the EPA exceeded its statutory allowances. On January 22,
2007, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") authorized a
permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") to Mingo
Logan Coal Company; this permit allowed Mingo Logan to
"discharge fill material from its Spruce No. 1 coal mine into
nearby streams, including the Pigeonroost and Oldhouse
Branches, and their tributaries."' 1 7 However, on September 3,
2009, the EPA sent a letter to the Corps, asking that the permit be
suspended, revoked, or modified based upon "downstream water
quality impacts that were not adequately addressed by the
permit. ' 1° 8 When the Corps refused the EPA's request, the EPA
issued a Final Determination, touting the withdrawal of the
permit that allowed the two streams to be used as disposal
sites.10 9 This withdrawal effectively invalidated Mingo Logan's
permit; such withdrawal of "the specification of discharge sites
after a permit has been issued is unprecedented in the history of
the [CWA]. ' ' 1 10
Mingo Logan filed suit, claiming that the EPA lacked the
authority to withdraw the permit."' After a statutory and
legislative history review, the court agreed that the EPA exceeded
their authority delegated by § 404 of the CWA. 112  More
1 5 Id. at 467-69.
106 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. EPA, 850 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
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specifically, the court held that the EPA could not invalidate a
permit once the Corps had issued it.11 3 The court conceded that,
although the relevant statute is ambiguous, even when
considering the ambiguity of the statute and the typical deference
granted to an agency, the "EPA's interpretation of the statute to
confer this power on itself is [still] not reasonable." 114  In
elaborating on this holding, the court gave the EPA a tongue-
lashing for its nonsensical argument in defense of its actions:
EPA claims that it is not revoking a
permit-something it does not have the authority
to do-because it is only withdrawing a
specification. Yet EPA simultaneously insists that
its withdrawal of the specification effectively
nullifies the permit. To explain how this would be
accomplished in the absence of any statutory
provision or even any regulation that details the
effect that the EPA's belated action would have on
an existing permit, EPA resorts to magical
thinking. It posits a scenario involving the
automatic self-destruction of a written permit
issued by an entirely separate federal agency after
years of study and consideration. Poof! Not only
is this non-revocation revocation logistically
complicated, but the possibility that it could
happen would leave permittees in the untenable
position of being unable to rely upon the sole
statutory touchstone for measuring their [CWA]
compliance: the permit. It is further unreasonable
to sow a lack of certainty into a system that was
expressly intended to provide finality. 115
Based upon these findings, the court held that when the
EPA sought to invalidate Mingo Logan's permit, it exceeded its
113id.114id.
"' Id. at 152.
AN UPWIND BATTLE: THE EPA TESTS THE LIMITS OF ITS
STATUTORY AUTHORITY AGAIN
authority that was granted by § 404 of the CWA because this
section does not allow the EPA to withdraw a permit once the
Corps has already issued that permit.116 Additionally, though the
statute may be ambiguous, the EPA's "interpretation of the
statute to confer [the power to withdraw the permit] on itself is
not reasonable."'
17
Yet again, in Virgina Department of Transportation v.
EPA,118 the EPA faced a challenge regarding whether it had
exceeded its authority in reference to the regulation of
stormwater. The specific issue raised was whether the CWA
allowed the EPA to regulate pollutant levels in a creek by
creating a Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") for the flow of
nonpollutants into a creek.1' 9 The EPA set TMDLs for Accotink
Creek in Fairfax County, Virginia as a result of previous and
unrelated litigation. The Accotink Creek was found to have
"benthic impairments,"' 120 and the TMDLs would seek to improve
the overall health of those organisms living in the creek. 12 The
specific TMDL for Accotink Creek purported to regulate the
amounts of sediment in the creek, which the EPA assumed to be
"a primary cause of the benthic impairment." 122  While both
parties agreed that sediment qualified as a pollutant, which the
EPA has authority to regulate, the point of contention was
whether stormwater flow could be categorized as a pollutant.
1 23
Although the EPA argued that stormwater could be
classified as a pollutant based on it being a "surrogate" for
sediment, the court was not persuaded. In looking to the explicit
6 Id. at 134.
117id
118No. 1:12-CV-775, 2013 WL 53741 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2013).
119 Id. at2.120 Id. at 1. "Benthic impairments" means that the organisms living in the creek
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language of the statute, as well as legislative history, the court
found little support for the EPA's "surrogate" analysis:
Stormwater runoff is not a pollutant, so
EPA is not authorized to regulate it via TMDL.
Claiming that the stormwater maximum load is a
surrogate for sediment, which is a pollutant and
therefore regulable, does not bring the stormwater
within the ambit of EPA's TMDL authority.
Whatever reason EPA has for thinking that
stormwater flow rate TMDL is a better way of
limiting sediment load than a sediment load
TMDL, EPA cannot be allowed to exceed its
clearly limited statutory authority. 1
24
The Court stated that the statutory language was explicit
in allowing the EPA to set TMDLs in order to regulate pollutants,
and "pollutants are carefully defined."1
25
B. Cooperative Federalism
These four cases, as well as the instant case, clearly
demonstrate the reality of an emerging pattern of the EPA
exceeding its statutorily proscribed authority. Aside from the
four separate holdings indicating that the EPA has exceeded its
power, these four holdings also have a lingering undertone of a
sharp judicial reprimand for the EPA's seemingly constant
decisions to go outside of the explicit boundaries created by the
plain language of the statute. Instead of adhering to the widely
recognized judicial preference for following the plain language of
a statute when defining its meaning, the EPA often relies on the
amorphous claim of "agency deference" and "implied authority."
The courts have repeatedly stated that deference to an agency is a
relevant consideration, however it is not a sole reason to grant the
EPA unlimited authority. Instead, as the cases above
124 Id. at 5.
125 id.
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demonstrate, the courts have consistently stated that the EPA's
rationale must be statutorily reasonable. Furthermore, the
opinions in these cases have expressly stated that if Congress
intended to authorize the EPA to take the challenged actions, then
they would have stated it in the statute. Protests by the EPA of
implied authority, traditional agency deference, and statutory
semantics and textual contrivances are simply not sufficient.
Through this strict adherence to the plain meaning of the
statute and deference to congressional intent, a judicial
preference for cooperative federalism has materialized. In the
instant case, the deference for this principle was clearly
overwhelming. In EME Homer City Generation , the majority
held the Transport Rule's simultaneous promulgation of FIPs that
would govern all upwind states was an impermissible usurpation
of the states' powers. 26  A cornerstone of the CAA is its
cooperative approach, which allows individual states to manage
pollution within their borders. 127 Under the CAA, states are
unconditionally given the "initial opportunity to implement
reductions required by [the] EPA under the good neighbor
obligation."'' 28 Meanwhile, the CAA "places the EPA in an
'oversight' role to ensure that each state manages its individual
pollution not only to control the level of emissions within its
borders, but also to preclude those emissions from causing
downwind states to fall out of compliance with federal
standards.' 29
However, under the Transport Rule, in an "unprecedented
application of the good neighbor provision,"' 30 the EPA adopted
126 EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
127 Id. at 29.
128 1d. at 11.
129 Richard 0. Faulk, D.C. Circuit Says EPA "s 'Transport Rule' Violates Clean
Air Act is 'Cooperative Federalism' on the Rise?, 33 No. 5 WJENV 1 (2012).
130EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 28.
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a top-down method to manage cross-border emissions."' This
quantified the good neighbor obligations without first allowing
the states the opportunity to develop SIPs in order to implement
those mandatory reductions.' 32 FTPs are only to be issued if and
when a state refuses or fails to create and submit a SIP.' 33 The
net result of these measures was that the Transport Rule "directly
imposed requirements without giving states an opportunity to
develop their own plans."'134 Additionally, the Transport Rule
employed an overly aggressive method in calculating the
necessary emissions reductions. Rather than holding each upwind
state responsible for its own contribution to a downwind states'
nonattainment, the EPA chose to enforce reductions that
exceeded an upwind state's contribution to a downwind state's
nonattainment, holding individual states responsible for more
than their share of a downwind state's pollution. In effect, "the
EPA decided to use the 'good neighbor' principle to impose
much more drastic cuts on 'upwind' states than the [CAA]
allowed-with the goal of using a regional 'cost-based' approach
to controlling pollution-as opposed to the 'state by state'
approach mandated by the statute."' 135 This approach undermines
and disregards the inherent federalism-based themes of the CAA:
collaboration and cooperation. 136
The court found these two blunders to be crucial flaws in
the Transport Rule. 137 The court reinforced a preference for
cooperative federalism by noting that the statute only granted the
EPA the authority to compel states to reduce emissions to the
extent of their own contributions to a downwind state's
nonattainment, noting that "[the] EPA has used the good-





134 Faulk, supra note 129, at 2.
135 Id.
136 EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 11.
137 Faulk, supra note 129, at 2.
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requirements . . . without regard to the limits imposed by the
statutory text. Whatever its merits as a policy matter, EPA's
Transport Rule violates the statute."' 38 This holding, despite a
forceful dissent, buttresses the argument that cooperative
federalism has materialized as a "bedrock principle of air
pollution policy."' 39  This court, and others, 140  have
acknowledged that this policy is proscribed by the statute and
thus outweighs any other policy of the EPA-political or
otherwise. The emergence of cooperative federalism is a recent
trend, and it is unclear how far courts will extend this policy;
however, within the parameters of the statutory language, courts
have undoubtedly proven that "it is a powerful tool for restraining
the EPA's authority."'
14 1
C. Reasons for the Trend
While this trend itself is interesting, the more productive
inquiry is the reason for this trend. The cases listed above, as
well as the instant case, raise at least one pertinent question: what
is the EPA doing? All of the cases described belabor the point
that, within the borders of the statutory language of the CWA or
the CAA, the EPA has exceeded its authority. In each of the
cases, the courts are not undertaking novel or unusual methods of
statutory interpretation, nor are they going through somersaults to
contort the language of the statute to justify the result that the
court may subjectively desire. 142  Rather, the courts are
138 Faulk, supra note 129, at 2.
139 Faulk, supra note 129, at 3.
140 See generally, Sierra Club v. EPA, 705 F.3d 548 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Mingo
Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 850 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Virginia Dept.
of Transp. v. EPA, 2013 WL 53741; see also, Texas v. EPA, 690 F.3d 670
(5th Cir. 2012) (A 5t Circuit case with a similar holding that follows this
trend. ).
141 Faulk, supra note 129, at 3.
142 See EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 7; Mingo Logan Coal Co.,
850 F.Supp.2d 133; Virginia Dept. of Transp., 2013 WL 53741.
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employing the judicial 'gold standard' of looking to the plain
meaning of the statute.
While there could certainly be political objectives
underlying this recent trend, there may also be a simpler
explanation: regulatory expediency. It takes time and money to
conduct research to determine what is contaminating stormwater,
or how much a state has contributed to a downwind state's
nonattainment. Scientific studies and research can take years to
figure out the cause of contamination, as can allowing a state the
time to create and adopt its own SIP. 143 Nevertheless, mandating
regulations without actually fixing the problem is far less time
consuming and expensive to bypass than scientific studies and
research. While it is admirable that the EPA is trying to achieve
measurable results quickly, perhaps that outcome is not the best
for the government or for the environment, especially when such
results are the consequence of an interest in administrative
convenience and expedience, rather than truly solving the
problem and repairing or improving the environment.
Additionally, when a regulation is challenged in court, any time
and money once saved is immediately lost in the judicial process.
As these cases stack up, with the same results each time,
the question lingers of why the EPA cannot fix the air or water
pollution problems while promulgating statutes and laws that can
still withstand a court challenge. The CAA, CWA, and the EPA
are all crucial to the well-being and public health of Americans.
The CAA and CWA have had amazing success in improving the
air and water quality through regulation by the EPA, 144 but the
143 The Court in EME Homer City Generation noted that the EPA was required
to allow states a "reasonable amount of time" to submit an SIP. EME Homer
City Generation, 696 F.3d at 30-31. Only after a state failed to timely submit a
SIP, or if the EPA rejected it for inadequacy, could the EPA step in and
promulgate a FIP. Id. If a SIP was rejected for inadequacy, the EPA was
required to allow the state time to revise and re-submit that SIP. Id.
144 See Success Story With Many Chapters Still To Come, EARTHJUSTICE.ORG,
http ://earthjustice.org/features/campaigns/a-success-story-with-many-chapters-
still-to-come (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). The success of the CAA and CWA
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EPA should still have to play by the rules. If the EPA could
manage to create rules that adhere to the statutory requirements,
then that would give them more time to fix the environment and
more time to achieve their regulatory objectives, without wasting
time and resources in court, arguing in favor of rules that cannot
possibly be held to comport with congressional and statutory
mandates.
D. Implications of the Trend
The immediate and most narrow implications of the trend
in the instant case are that, since the court vacated the Transport
Rule, CAIR is still in place, and the EPA has once again been
sent back to the drawing board to draft a new rule that is
consistent with the holding in the instant case, as well as with
North Carolina and Michigan. CAIR itself is flawed although
still operative, because it does not "ensure that upwind emissions
reductions would be sufficient to help downwind states meet air
standards."' 145 With CAIR still intact, the saga for the EPA to
create a rule that will withstand judicial scrutiny continues.
may be contrasted with the infamous air pollution struggles of China, as well
as the potential solutions to those struggles. See generally Solutions To Air
Pollution, GREENPEACE PEACE AsiA,
http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/campaigns/air-pollution/solutions/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2013); Monica Tan, 8 Must-know Facts About China's Air
Pollution Crisis, GREENPEACE EAST AsIA (Feb. 7, 2013, 7:14 PM),
http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/news/blog/8-must-know-facts-about-
chinas-air-pollution-/blog/43862/; Edward Wong, As Pollution Worsens in




145 See Jessica Coomes, D. C. Circuit Vacates Cross-State Rule, Orders EPA to
Keep Bush-Era Rule in Place, BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORT (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.bna.com/dc-circuit-vacates-n12884911323/. Under the 1998 NO,
SIP Call rule, the EPA "developed an emissions cap-and-trade program to
address the interstate transport of nitrogen oxides. Id. CAIR replaced this rule
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Additionally, the court's decision to vacate the Transport
Rule may leave tremors throughout the industries involved.
Aside from the Transport Rule being outside of the EPA's
authority to enact, the rule itself had a legitimate economical and
environmental purpose. Natural gas prices have decreased
dramatically in recent years, and the Transport Rule could have
boosted those prices:
If [the Transport Rule] had gone into effect . . . the
additional demand from generators seeking to lower emissions by
switching to the relatively cleaner natural gas may have helped to
balance supply and demand. However, without the regulatory
boost from [the Transport Rule], already rock bottom prices for
natural gas could drop even further. Ironically, such low prices
for natural gas could ultimately lead to a major increase in price
volatility for both natural gas and electricity by forcing natural
gas producers to cut back sharply on drilling, setting the stage for
steep future price increases which could have been avoided if
market conditions were more stable ... At least for a period of
several years, extremely low natural gas prices could have a
substantial effect on the nascent renewable energy industry and
sharply inhibit energy efficiency efforts. 1
46
While the effect on natural gas prices and energy
efficiency efforts is certainly detrimental for environmentalists,
other energy-intensive industries may also be affected. 147 With
these additional economic and environmental implications of the
decision, it becomes even more imperative that the EPA revise
in 2005. Id. CAIR was challenged and remanded to the EPA in 2008 by the
D.C. Circuit for the reason stated above. Id. The Transport Rule was the
EPA's attempt to replace CAIR, but the decision in the instant case vacated the
Transport Rule and left CAIR intact. Id.
146, Julie A. Weisman et al., CSAPR Is Stayed - What Are The Real World
Ramifications?, CLIENT ADVISORY (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=359.
14 7 id.
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the rule so that it comports with the CAA, as well as the majority
opinion in the instant case.
Perhaps encouraged by the vigorous dissent by Judge
Rogers, on October 5, 2012, the EPA petitioned the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en banc of the
decision in the instant case. 148 In its petition, the EPA first argued
that the three-judge panel "lacked jurisdiction to hold that [the]
EPA had no authority to promulgate FIPs."'149 Additionally, the
EPA stated that "the panel ignored the plain language of the
[CAA] requiring states to submit SIPs by a certain date," that the
majority's analysis regarding significant contributions violated
"well-settled waiver and exhaustion principles," and finally that
the majority "wrongfully chose its own construction of the
ambiguous statutory term 'contribute significantly' over the
EPA's own construction, which had previously been upheld."'
150
In this petition for rehearing, the EPA received support from
various intervenors, making public health and policy arguments
that the Transport Rule would save lives, improve air quality, and
save "$110 to $280 billion in annual net social benefits." 151
As if the majority opinion was not sufficiently clear in its
designation of the boundaries of EPA authority, unmistakably
holding that the EPA's authority is limited to the plain meaning
of the statute as mandated by Congress, the D.C. Circuit
summarily denied the EPA's petition for rehearing on January 24,
2013.152 Not only did the seven-judge panel deny a rehearing en
148See Kenneth W. Irvin et al., United States: EPA Petitions DC Circuit For







151 id.152 See EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (2012).
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banc, the original three-judge panel also denied the EPA's
request for rehearing. 153 This denial serves as an unambiguous
message to the EPA, it also means that the only options
remaining for the EPA are to make a new rule or appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States.' 
54
The majority opinion in the instant case, as well as the
other cited cases, serve as a warning to the EPA for future cases.
The Court is clear in its language that the EPA must follow the
statutory designations of authority, regardless of whatever policy
concerns the EPA may deem to be important when promulgating
a rule. This message is important for future rules devised by the
EPA, and it has relevant implications for the wider field of
environmental law. While the EPA may have admirable and lofty
motivations for creating a rule-saving lives, improving public
health, enhancing national air and water quality, saving
taxpayers' money-those policy considerations must yield to the
plain meaning of the statute, and the EPA must follow those
statutory rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of the EPA continuing this trend of having
rules struck down because the EPA exceeded its own authority
could be harrowing. While the EPA claims all of the
aforementioned policy considerations, if the EPA cannot find a
way to draft rules that can survive a judicial challenge, then the
EPA will never achieve those policy objectives. The CAA and
CWA have been successful in improving the environment and the
153 Jessica Coomes, D.C. Circuit Declines to Rehear Decision Vacating EPA
Cross-State Air Rule, ENVIONMENT REPORTER (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.bna.com/dc-circuit-declines-nl 7179872026/.
154 See id.; Jeffery Holmstead, former EPA assistant administrator, stated that
an appeal to SCOTUS seemed unlikely, given that the Solicitor General's
office is "pretty careful about using its credibility with the court," and that,
even if there were a petition for certiorari, the case would be unlikely to
"interest the justices because it focuses on obscure issues, not overarching
legal or policy issues." Id.
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nation's public health, but those improvements cannot continue
when courts are consistently forced to vacate rules because the
EPA does not have the power to implement a given rule. It
becomes an unbreakable cycle of the EPA claiming that a given
rule is necessary for environmental and public health standards,
but those standards cannot be achieved if the EPA's rules cannot
escape challenge or withstand judicial scrutiny. Rather, time and
resources are wasted in litigation concerning the meaning of
statutes, instead of putting the same time and resources into the
same environmental goals that the statute seeks to improve.
If this trend continues, progress will never be made. The
courts in the series of cases listed above have given the EPA clear
instructions on the boundaries of the agency's authority, and it
now becomes crucial for the EPA to stay within those
parameters, rather than sloppily drafting rules touting public
health considerations, when, in reality, the justification appears to
be administrative convenience and expedience.
55
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155 Scott Segal, the director of the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council,
commented "when the EPA takes liberties with its legal authority, the result is
higher prices for consumers, businesses, schools, and hospitals. At a time of
economic recession, the country cannot afford sloppy rulemaking of this sort.
The EPA can and should do better." See Frederic J. Frommer, Appeals Court
Rules That EPA Exceeds Statutory Authority, GOPUSA.CoM (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.gopusa.com/news/2012/08/22/appeals-court-rules-that-epa-
exceeds-statutory-authority/.
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